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Abstract
This paper considers a class of generalized convex games where each player is associated with a convex objective function, a
convex inequality constraint and a convex constraint set. The players aim to compute a Nash equilibrium through communi-
cating with neighboring players. The particular challenge we consider is that the component functions are unknown a priori
to associated players. We study two distributed computation algorithms and analyze their convergence properties in the pres-
ence of data transmission delays and dynamic changes of network topologies. The algorithm performance is verified through
demand response on the IEEE 30-bus Test System. Our technical tools integrate convex analysis, variational inequalities and
simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation.
1 Introduction
Recent advances on information technologies facili-
tate real-time message exchanges and decision-making
among geographically dispersed strategic entities. This
has boosted the emergence of new generation of net-
worked systems; e.g., the smart grid and intelligent
transportation systems. These networked systems share
some common features: on one hand, the entities do not
belong to a single authority and may pursue different
or even competitive interests; on the other hand, each
entity keeps private information which is unaccessi-
ble to others. It is of great interest to design practical
mechanisms which allow for efficient coordination of
self-interested entities and ensure network-wide perfor-
mance. Game theory along with its distributed compu-
tation algorithms represents a promising tool to achieve
the goal.
In many applications, distributed computation is exe-
cuted in uncertain environments. For example, mobile
robots are deployed in an operating environment where
environmental distribution functions are unknown to
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robots in advance; e.g., [33,39]. In traffic pricing, pric-
ing policies of system operators may not be available
to drivers. In optimal power flow control, the structural
parameters of power systems are of national security in-
terest and kept confidential from the public. The ab-
sence of such information makes game components; e.g.,
objective and constraint functions, inaccessible to play-
ers. Very recently, the informational constraint has been
stimulating the investigation of adaptive algorithms, in-
cluding [16,21,33] for continuous games and [23,39] for
discrete games.
Literature review. Non-cooperative game theory has
been widely used as a mathematical framework to
reason about multiple selfish decision makers; see for
instance [8]. These games have found a variety of ap-
plications in economics, communication and robotics;
see [3,12,13,16,24]. In non-cooperative games, decision
making of individuals is inherently distributed. Very
recently, this attractive feature has been utilized to
synthesize cooperative control schemes, and a partial
reference list for this regard includes [5,6,19,33,39].
The set of papers more relevant to our work is concerned
with generalized Nash games where strategy spaces
are continuous and the actions of players are coupled
through utility and constraint functions. Generalized
Nash games are first formulated in [4]. Since then, a great
effort has been dedicated to studying the existence and
structural properties of generalized Nash equilibria in;
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e.g., [31] and the recent survey paper [14]. A number of
algorithms have been proposed to compute generalized
Nash equilibria, including ODE-based methods [20,31],
nonlinear Gauss-Seidel-type approaches [29], iterative
primal-dual Tikhonov schemes [35] and best-response
dynamics [28].
As mentioned, the set of papers [16,21,23,33,39] inves-
tigates the adaptiveness of game theoretic learning al-
gorithms. However, none of the papers mentioned in
the last two paragraphs studies the robustness of the
algorithms with respect to network unreliability; e.g.,
data transmission delays, quantization and dynamically
changing topologies. In contrast, the robustness has been
extensively studied for consensus and distributed op-
timization, including, to name a few, [18,27] for time-
varying topologies, [30] for quantization and [25] for
time delays. Yet the adaptiveness issue has not been ad-
dressed in this group of papers.
Contributions. In this paper, we aim to solve a class
of generalized convex games over unreliable networks
where the structures of component functions are un-
known to the associated players. That is, we aim to si-
multaneously address the issues of adaptiveness and ro-
bustness for generalized convex games.
In the games, each player is associated with a convex
objective function and subject to a private convex in-
equality constraint and a private convex constraint set.
The component functions are assumed to be smooth and
are unknown to the associated players. We investigate
distributed first-order gradient-based computation algo-
rithms for the following two scenarios:
[Scenario One] The game map is pseudo-monotone and
the maximum delay (equivalently, the maximum num-
ber of packet dropouts or link breaks) is bounded but
unknown;
[Scenario Two] The inequality constraints are absent,
the (reduced) game map is strongly monotone and the
maximum delay is known.
Inspired by simultaneous perturbation stochastic ap-
proximation for optimization in [32], we utilize finite dif-
ferences with diminishing approximation errors to esti-
mate first-order gradients. We propose two distributed
algorithms for the two scenarios and formally prove their
asymptotic convergence. The comparison of the two pro-
posed algorithms is given in Section 5.1. The analysis
integrates the tools from convex analysis, variational
inequalities and simultaneous perturbation stochastic
approximation. The algorithm performance is verified
through demand response on the IEEE 30-bus Test Sys-
tem. A preliminary version of the current paper was
published in [36] where the adaptiveness issue was not
investigated.
2 Problem formulation
In this section, we present the generalized convex game
considered in the paper. It is followed by the notions and
notations used throughout the paper.
2.1 Generalized convex game
Consider the set of players V , {1, · · · , N} where the
state of player i is denoted as x[i] ∈ Xi ⊆ Rni . The play-
ers are selfish and pursue different interests. In particu-
lar, given the joint state x[−i] ∈ X−i ,
∏
j 6=iXj of its ri-
vals 1 , each player i aims to solve the following program
parameterized by x[−i] ∈ X−i:
min
x[i]∈Xi
fi(x
[i], x[−i]), s.t. G[i](x[i], x[−i]) ≤ 0, (1)
where fi : R
n → R and G[i] : Rn → Rmi with n ,∑
i∈V ni. In the remainder of the paper, we assume that
the following properties about problem (1) hold:
Assumption 2.1 The maps fi andG
[i] are smooth, and
the maps fi(·, x[−i]) and G[i](·, x[−i]) are convex in x[i].
The set Xi is convex and compact, and X ∩ Y 6= ∅
where X ,
∏
i∈V Xi and Y ,
∏
i∈V Yi with Yi , {x ∈
X | G[i](x) ≤ 0}.
We now proceed to provide an equivalent form of prob-
lem (1). To achieve this, we define the set-valued map
Xfi : X−i → 2Xi as follows:
Xfi (x
[−i]) = {x[i] ∈ Xi | G[i](x[i], x[−i]) ≤ 0}.
The set Xfi (x
[−i]) represents the collection of feasible
actions for player i when its opponents choose the joint
state of x[−i] ∈ X−i. With the map Xfi , problem (1) of
player i is equivalent to the following one:
min
x[i]∈Xf
i
(x[−i])
fi(x
[i], x[−i]). (2)
Given x[−i] ∈ X−i, each player i aims to solve prob-
lem (2). The collection of such coupled optimization
problems consists of the generalized convex game (for
short, CVX). For the CVX game, we adopt the general-
ized Nash equilibrium (for short, GNE) as the solution
notion which none of the players is willing to unilaterally
deviate from:
1 We use the shorthand −i , V \{i} throughout the paper.
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Definition 2.1 The joint state x˜ ∈ X ∩ Y is a general-
ized Nash equilibrium of the CVX game if the following
holds:
fi(x˜) ≤ fi(x[i], x˜[−i]), ∀x[i] ∈ Xfi (x˜[−i]), ∀i ∈ V.
Denote by XCVX the set of GNEs of the CVX game. The
following lemma verifies the non-emptiness of XCVX.
Lemma 2.1 The set of generalized Nash equilibria of
the CVX game is not empty, i.e., XCVX 6= ∅.
Proof: Recall that fi is convex and X ∩ Y is compact.
Hence, XCVX 6= ∅ is a direct result of [14,31]. •
In the CVX game, the players desire to seek a GNE.
It is noted that fi, G
[i], and Xi are private informa-
tion of player i and unaccessible to others. In order to
compute a GNE, it becomes necessary that the players
are inter-connected and able to communicate with each
other to exchange their partial estimates of GNEs. The
interconnection between players will be represented by
a directed graph G = (V, E) where E ⊂ V × V \ diag(V )
is the set of edges. The neighbor relation is determined
by the dependency of fi and/or G
[i] on x[j]. In particu-
lar, (i, j) ∈ E if and only if fi and/or G[i] depend upon
x[j]. Denote by N INi , {j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E} the set of
in-neighbors of player i.
In this paper, we aim to develop distributed algorithms
which allow for the computation of GNEs in the presence
of the following two challenges.
(1) Data transmissions between the players in V are un-
reliable, and subject to transmission delays, packet
dropouts and/or link breaks. We let x[j](k−τ [i]j (k))
with τ
[i]
j (k) ≥ 0 be either (i) the outdated state of
player j received by player i at time k due to trans-
mission delays; or (ii) the latest state of player j re-
ceived by player i by time k due to packet dropouts
and/or link breaks. For example, if the link from
player j to player i is broken at time k, then player i
cannot receive the message x[j](k) from player j.
For this case, player i uses the more recent received
message sent from player j which is x[j](k−τ [i]j (k)).
Denote by Λi(k) , {x[j](k − τ [i]j (k))}j∈N INi the set
of latest states ofN INi received by player i at time k.
Let τmax , supk≥0 maxi∈V maxj∈N INi τ
[i]
j (k) be the
maximum delay or the maximum number of suc-
cessive packet dropouts.
(2) Each player i is unaware of the structures of fi and
G[i] but can observe their realizations. That is, if the
players input the joint state x into fi, then player i
can observe the realized value of fi(x).
The disclosure of the value fi(x) is case dependent.
In [33,39], mobile sensors are unaware of environmen-
tal distribution functions but they can observe induced
utilities via on-site measurements. This is an example of
engineering systems. Section 6 will provide a concrete
example of demand response of power networks where
the system operator discloses realized values via com-
munication given the decisions of end-users. This is an
example of social systems.
3 Preliminaries
In the CVX game, each player is subject to an inequal-
ity constraint. In optimization literature, Lagrangian re-
laxation is a widely used approach to handle inequal-
ity constraints. Following this vein, we will perform La-
grangian relaxation on the CVX game and obtain the
unconstrained convex (for short, UC) game.
In the UC game, there are two sets of players: the set
of primal players V and the set of dual players Vm ,
{1, · · · , N}. Define the following private Lagrangian
Hi : Rn×Rmi≥0 → R: Hi(x, µ[i]) , fi(x) + 〈µ[i], G[i](x)〉,
for primal player i ∈ V and dual player i ∈ Vm.
Given any x[−i] ∈ X−i and µ[i] ∈ Rmi≥0, each primal
player i ∈ V aims to minimize Hi over x[i] ∈ Xi; i.e.,
minx[i]∈Xi Hi(x[i], x[−i], µ[i]), and, instead, the objec-
tive of the dual player i ∈ Vm is to maximize Hi over
µ[i] ∈ Mi ⊆ Rmi≥0; i.e., minµ[i]∈Mi −Hi(x, µ[i]) where
the set Mi ⊆ Rmi≥0 is convex, non-empty and will be
introduced in the sequel. We let η , (x, µ) and the set
K , X × M with M , ∏i∈V Mi. The above game
among the players in V ∪ Vm is referred to as the UC
game parameterized by the setM . The set ofM will play
an important role in determining the properties of the
UC game and we will discuss the choice of M later. The
solution concept for the UC game parameterized by M
is the standard notion of Nash equilibrium given below:
Definition 3.1 The joint state of (x˜, µ˜) ∈ X × M is
a Nash equilibrium of the UC game parameterized by
M if the following holds for all i ∈ V : Hi(x˜, µ˜[i]) ≤
Hi(x[i], x˜[−i], µ˜[i]), ∀x[i] ∈ Xi, and the following holds
for all i ∈ Vm: Hi(x˜, µ[i]) ≤ Hi(x˜, µ˜[i]), ∀µ[i] ∈Mi.
Denote by XUC(M) the set of NEs of the UC game pa-
rameterized by M . We now proceed to illustrate the re-
lation between the UC game and the CVX game. Before
doing so, let us state the following boundedness assump-
tion on the dual solutions:
Assumption 3.1 There is a vector ϑ , (ϑi)i∈V ∈ RN>0
such that for any (x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC(Rm≥0), ‖µ˜[i]‖ ≤ ϑi for
i ∈ V .
Remark 3.1 We would like to make a remark on As-
sumption 3.1. For convex optimization, it is shown in [17]
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that the Lagrangian multipliers are uniformly bounded
under the standard Slater’s condition. This boundedness
property is used in [26] and further in [37,38] to solve
convex and non-convex programs in centralized and dis-
tributed manners. In this paper, Assumption 3.1, on one
hand, ensures the existence of GNEs, and on the other
hand, guarantees the boundedness of estimates and gra-
dients for the case of unknown τmax. We will discuss the
verification of Assumption 3.1 in Section 5. •
The following proposition characterizes the relations be-
tween the UC game and the CVX game.
Proposition 3.1 The following properties hold:
(P1) Consider any (x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC(M). We have x˜ ∈ XCVX
if the following properties hold:
• feasibility; i.e., G[i](x˜) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ V ;
• slackness complementarity; i.e., 〈µ˜[i], G[i](x˜)〉 = 0
for all i ∈ V .
(P2) Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds. Consider the UC
game parameterized by M with Mi , {µ[i] ∈
Rmi≥0 | ‖µ[i]‖ ≤ ϑi + ri} for some ri > 0. Then
XUC(M) 6= ∅. In addition, for any (x˜, µ˜) ∈
XUC(M), it holds that x˜ ∈ XCVX.
Proof: The proof of (P1) is a slight extension of
the results in [9] to our game setup. For the sake of
completeness, we summarize the analysis here. Since
〈µ˜[i], G[i](x˜)〉 = 0, we have the following relation:
fi(x˜) = Hi(x˜, µ˜[i])− 〈µ˜[i], G[i](x˜)〉 = Hi(x˜, µ˜[i]). (3)
Since (x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC(M), then the following relation holds
for all x[i] ∈ Xi:
Hi(x˜, µ˜[i])−Hi(x[i], x˜[−i], µ˜[i]) ≤ 0. (4)
Substitute (3) into (4), and it renders the following for
any x[i] ∈ Xi:
fi(x˜) ≤ fi(x[i], x˜[−i]) + 〈µ˜[i], G[i](x[i], x˜[−i])〉,
and thus fi(x˜) ≤ fi(x[i], x˜[−i]), ∀x[i] ∈ Xfi (x˜[−i]),
by noting that 〈µ˜[i], G[i](x[i], x˜[−i])〉 ≤ 0 for any
x[i] ∈ Xfi (x˜[−i]). Recall that G[i](x˜) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ V .
The above arguments hold for all i ∈ V , and thus it
establishes that x˜ ∈ XCVX.
We now proceed to show (P2). Since µ[i] ≥ 0, Hi is a
positive combination of convex functions of x[i]. Thus
Hi is convex in x[i]. It is easy to see that −Hi is con-
vex (actually affine) in x[i]. Since X and M are convex
and compact, it follows that XUC(M) 6= ∅ by the re-
sults on generalized convex games in; e.g., [14,31]. Pick
any (x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC(M) and then ‖µ˜[i]‖ ≤ ϑi by Assump-
tion 3.1. We then have the following relation:
Hi(x˜, µ˜[i])−Hi(x˜, µ[i]) ≥ 0, ∀µ[i] ∈Mi,
and thus,
〈µ[i] − µ˜[i], G[i](x˜)〉 ≤ 0, ∀µ[i] ∈Mi. (5)
We now proceed to verify by contradiction the feasi-
bility of G[i](x˜) ≤ 0 and the complementary slackness
of 〈µ˜[i], G[i](x˜)〉 = 0. Assume that G[i](x˜)` > 0. We
choose µ[i] such that µ
[i]
` = µ˜
[i]
` + piri and µ
[i]
`′ = 0
for `′ 6= ` where pi > 0 is sufficiently small such that
µ[i] ∈ Mi. Then it follows from (5) that riG[i](x˜)` ≤ 0
which is a contradiction. Hence, we have the feasibility
of G[i](x˜) ≤ 0. Combine it with µ˜[i] ≥ 0, and it ren-
ders that 〈µ˜[i]〉, G[i](x˜) ≤ 0. On the other hand, we let
µ[i] = 0 in the relation (5) and have 〈µ˜[i], G[i](x˜)〉 ≥ 0.
Hence, it renders that 〈µ˜[i], G[i](x˜)〉 = 0. We reach the
desired result by using the property (P1). •
3.1 Notations and notions
The vector 1n represents the column vector with n ones.
The vector e
[`]
n is the one in Rn whose `-th coordinate
is one and whose other coordinates are all zero. For
any pair of vectors a, b ∈ Rp, the relation a ≤ b means
a` ≤ b` for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ p. Since the function fi is con-
tinuous and Xi is compact, then the following quanti-
ties are well-defined: σi,min = infx∈Xi fi(x), σi,max =
supx∈Xi fi(x), σmin = infx∈X
∑
i∈V fi(x), σmax =
supx∈X
∑
i∈V fi(x). Given a non-negative scalar se-
quence {α(k)}k≥0, it is summable if
∑∞
k=0 α(k) < +∞
and square summable if
∑∞
k=0 α(k)
2 < +∞.
In the remainder of the paper, we will use some notions
about monotonicity, and the readers are referred to [7,15]
for detailed discussion. The mapping F : Z → Z ′ is
strongly monotone with constant ρ > 0 over Z if for each
pair of η, η′ ∈ Z, the following holds:
〈F (η)− F (η′), η − η′〉 ≥ ρ‖η − η′‖2.
The mapping F : Z → Z ′ is monotone over Z if for each
pair of η, η′ ∈ Z, the following holds:
〈F (η)− F (η′), η − η′〉 ≥ 0.
The mapping F : Z → Z ′ is pseudo-monotone over Z if
for each pair of η, η′ ∈ Z, it holds that 〈F (η′), η−η′〉 ≥ 0
implies 〈F (η), η−η′〉 ≥ 0. It is known that strong mono-
tonicity implies monotonicity, and monotonicity implies
pseudo-monotonicity [15].
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Given the non-empty, convex, and closed set Z ∈ Rn,
the projection operator onto Z, PZ : R
n → Z, is defined
as PZ [z] = argminx∈Z‖x− z‖. The following is the non-
expansiveness of the projection operator; e.g., [9].
Lemma 3.1 Let Z be a non-empty, closed and convex
set in Rn. For any z ∈ Rn, the following holds for any
y ∈ Z: ‖PX [z]− y‖2 ≤ ‖z − y‖2 − ‖PX [z]− z‖2.
We define ∇x[i]Hi(x, µ[i]) as the gradient of the convex
function Hi(·, x[−i], µ[i]) at x[i], and ∇µ[i]Hi(x, µ[i]) =
G[i](x) as the gradient of the concave (actually affine)
functionHi(x, ·) at µ[i]. Define∇Θ as the map of partial
gradients of the players’ objective functions:
∇Θ(η) , [∇x[1]H1(x, µ[1])T · · · ∇x[N]HN (x, µ[N ])T
∇µ[1] −H1(x, µ[1]) · · · ∇µ[N] −HN (x, µ[N ])]T .
The map ∇Θ is referred to as the game map. It is well-
known that ∇Θ is monotone (resp. strongly monotone)
over K if and only if its Jacobian ∇2Θ(η) is positive
semi-definite (resp. positive definite) for all η ∈ K.
For G[i](x) ≤ 0 being absent, we define ∇x[i]fi(x) as
the gradient of the convex function fi(·, x[−i]) at x[i].
Define∇Θr as the map of partial gradients of the players’
objective functions:
∇Θr(x) , [∇x[1]f1(x)T · · · ∇x[N]fN (x)T ]T .
The map ∇Θr is referred to as the (reduced) game map
for G[i](x) ≤ 0 being absent.
Given any convex and closed set Z, let PZ be the pro-
jection operator onto the set Z.
The following lemma is a direct result of the smoothness
of the component functions and the compactness of the
constraint sets.
Lemma 3.2 The image set of the game map ∇Θ is uni-
formly bounded over K. In addition, the game map ∇Θ
(resp.∇Θr) is Lipschitz continuous overK with constant
LΘ (resp. LΘr).
4 Distributed computation algorithms
In this section, we will study the scenarios mentioned in
the introduction. Proposition 3.1 reveals that it suffices
to compute a Nash equilibrium inXUC if Assumption 3.1
holds. In the remainder of this section, we will suppose
Assumption 3.1 holds, and then each dual player i can
define the set ofMi , {µ[i] ∈ Rmi≥0 | ‖µ[i]‖ ≤ ϑi+ri}with
ri > 0. Assumption 3.1 will be justified in Section 5.2.
4.1 Scenario one: pseudo-monotone game map and un-
known τmax
In this section, we synthesize a distributed first-order al-
gorithm for the case where the quantity τmax is unknown
and the game map ∇Θ is merely pseudo-monotone.
Algorithm 1 is based on projected primal-dual gradient
methods where each primal or dual player i 2 updates
its own estimate by moving along its partial gradient
with a certain step-size and projecting the estimate onto
the local constraint set. Recall that fi and G
[i] are un-
known to player i. Then player i cannot compute partial
gradient∇x[i]Hi. Inspired by simultaneous perturbation
stochastic approximation in; e.g., [32], we use finite dif-
ferences to approximate the partial gradient∇x[i]Hi; i.e.,
for ` = 1, · · · , ni,
[∇x[i]Hi(x(k), µ[i](k))]`
≈ 1
2ci(k)
(Hi(x[i](k) + ci(k)e[`]ni , x[−i](k), µ[i](k))
−Hi(x[i](k)− ci(k)e[`]ni , x[−i](k), µ[i](k))
)
, (6)
where−ci(k)e[`]ni and ci(k)e[`]ni are two-way perturbations.
In addition, ∇µ[i]Hi(x(k), µ[i](k)) = G[i](x(k)). In Al-
gorithm 1, D[i]x (k) (resp. D[i]µ (k)) is the right-hand side
of (6) (resp. ∇µ[i]Hi(x, µ[i])) with delayed estimates.
Here we assume that player i can observe the values as-
sociated with fi and G
[i] and thus D[i]x (k) and D[i]µ (k).
The scalar ci(k) > 0 is the perturbation magnitude.
When it is small, the finite-difference approximation is
close to the partial gradient. In order to asymptotically
eliminate the error induced by the finite-difference ap-
proximation, ci(k) needs to be diminishing. The decreas-
ing rate of ci(k) should match that of computation step-
sizes α(k). Otherwise, the convergence to Nash equilib-
rium may be prevented. This is captured by (A4) of The-
orem 4.1.
The following theorem demonstrates that Algorithm 1
is able to achieve a GNE from any initial state in K.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose the following hold:
(A1) the quantity τmax is finite;
(A2) Assumptions 2.1 and 3.1 hold;
(A3) the sequence of {α(k)} is positive, not summable but
square summable;
(A4) the sequence of {α(k) max
i∈V
ci(k)} is summable;
(A5) the game map ∇Θ is pseudo-monotone over K.
2 In practical implementation, the update rules of primal
player i and dual player i are both executed by real player i.
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Algorithm 1 Distributed gradient-based algorithm for
Scenario one
Require: Each primal player i ∈ V chooses the initial
state x[i](0) ∈ Xi. And each dual player i ∈ Vm defines
the set Mi and chooses the initial state µ
[i](0) ∈Mi.
Ensure: At each k ≥ 0, each player in V ∪ Vm executes
the following steps:
1. Each primal player i ∈ V updates its state according
to the following rule:
x[i](k + 1) = PXi [x[i](k)− α(k)D[i]x (k)],
where the approximate gradient D[i]x (k) is given by
[D[i]x (k)]` =
1
2ci(k)
{fi(x[i](k) + ci(k)e[`]ni ,Λi(k))
+ 〈µ[i](k), G[i](x[i](k) + ci(k)e[`]ni ,Λi(k))〉
− fi(x[i](k)− ci(k)e[`]ni ,Λi(k))
− 〈µ[i](k), G[i](x[i](k)− ci(k)e[`]ni ,Λi(k))〉}, (7)
for ` = 1, · · · , ni.
2. Each dual player i ∈ Vm updates its state according
to the following rule:
µ[i](k + 1) = PMi [µ[i](k) + α(k)D[i]µ (k)],
where the gradient D[i]µ (k) is given by D[i]µ (k) =
∇µ[i]Hi(x[i](k),Λi(k), µ[i](k)) = G[i](x[i](k),Λi(k)).
3. Repeat for k = k + 1.
For any initial state η(0) ∈ K, the sequence of {η(k)}
generated by Algorithm 1 converges to some (x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC
where x˜ ∈ XCVX.
Proof: First of all, it is noted that K is compact since
each Xi and Xi is compact in Assumption 3.1 and (P2)
in Proposition 3.1 as well as ∇Θ is uniformly bounded
over K in Lemma 3.2.
Then we write Algorithm 1 in the following compact
form:
η(k + 1) = PK [η(k)− α(k)D(k)], (8)
whereD(k) , ((D[i]x (k)T )Ti∈V , (−D[i]µ (k)T )Ti∈Vm)T is sub-
ject to time delays and perturbations. Then pick any
η ∈ K. It follows from the non-expansiveness of the pro-
jection operator PK , Lemma 3.1, that for any η ∈ K,
the following relation holds:
‖η(k + 1)− η‖2
≤ ‖η(k)− α(k)D(k)− η‖2 − ‖D(k)‖2
≤ ‖η(k)− α(k)D(k)− η‖2
= ‖η(k)− η‖2 − 2α(k)〈D(k), η(k)− η〉
+ α(k)2‖D(k)‖2. (9)
It follows from (9) that
2α(k)〈D(k), η(k)− η〉 ≤ ‖η(k)− η‖2
− ‖η(k + 1)− η‖2 + α(k)2‖D(k)‖2. (10)
For any k ≥ 0 and i, we define the following:
Dˆ[i]x (k) = ∇x[i]Hi(x[i](k), {x[j](k)}j∈N INi , µ
[i](k)),
Dˆ[i]µ (k) , ∇µ[i]Hi(x[i](k), {x[j](k)}j∈N INi , µ
[i](k)),
Dˆ(k) , ((Dˆ[i]x (k)T )Ti∈V , (−Dˆ[i]µ (k)T )Ti∈Vm)T , (11)
which are the gradients evaluated at the delay-free
states. So, the quantity Dˆ(k) is free of time delays and
perturbations.
Similarly, for any k ≥ 0 and i, we define the following:
D˜[i]x (k) = ∇x[i]Hi(x[i](k),Λi(k), µ[i](k)),
D˜[i]µ (k) , ∇µ[i]Hi(x[i](k),Λi(k), µ[i](k)),
D˜(k) , ((D˜[i]x (k)T )Ti∈V , (−D˜[i]µ (k)T )Ti∈Vm)T ,
which are the gradients evaluated at the delayed states.
Then the quantity D˜(k) is free of perturbations but sub-
ject to time delays.
With the above notations at hand, the relation (10) im-
plies the following:
2α(k)〈Dˆ(k), η(k)− η〉 ≤ α(k)2‖D(k)‖2 + ‖η(k)− η‖2
− ‖η(k + 1)− η‖2 + 2α(k)〈D˜(k)−D(k), η(k)− η〉
+ 2α(k)〈Dˆ(k)− D˜(k), η(k)− η〉
≤ α(k)2‖D(k)‖2 + ‖η(k)− η‖2
− ‖η(k + 1)− η‖2 + 2α(k)‖D˜(k)−D(k)‖‖η(k)− η‖
+ 2α(k)‖Dˆ(k)− D˜(k)‖‖η(k)− η‖. (12)
Now let us examine the term with ‖Dˆ(k)−D˜(k)‖ on the
right-hand side of (12). Since x(k) ∈ X and X is convex
and closed, it then follows from the non-expansiveness
of the projection operator PX , that
‖η(k + 1)− η(k)‖ = ‖PK [η(k)− α(k)D(k)]− PK [η(k)]‖
≤ α(k)‖D(k)‖. (13)
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Consequently, it follows from the Lipschitiz continuity
of the game map ∇Θ and (12), (13) that
‖Dˆ(k)− D˜(k)‖
≤
∑
i∈V
(‖Dˆ[i]x (k)− D˜[i]x (k)‖+ ‖Dˆ[i]µ (k)− D˜[i]µ (k)‖)
≤ 2NLΘ
k−1∑
τ=k−τmax
‖η(τ + 1)− η(τ)‖
≤ 2NLΘ
k−1∑
τ=k−τmax
α(τ)‖D(τ)‖. (14)
Since K is compact and the image of ∇Θ is uniformly
compact, (14) implies that there is Υ > 0 such that
2α(k)‖Dˆ(k)− D˜(k)‖‖η(k)− η‖
≤ 2NLΘ
k−1∑
τ=k−τmax
2α(k)α(τ)‖D(τ)‖‖η(k)− η‖
≤ 2NLΘ
k−1∑
τ=k−τmax
(
α(k)2 + α(τ)2‖D(τ)‖2‖η(k)− η‖2)
≤ 2NLΘτmaxα(k)2 + Υ
k−1∑
τ=k−τmax
α(τ)2. (15)
Now consider the term with ‖D˜(k)−D(k)‖ on the right-
hand side in (12). Recall that K is compact. By the
Taylor expansion, we reach that
D[i]x (k) = ∇x[i]fi(x[i](k),Λi(k))
+
mi∑
`=1
µ
[i]
` (k)∇x[i]G[i]` (x[i](k),Λi(k)) +O(ci(k))1ni .
(16)
With the above relation, we have the following for
D˜[i](k)−D[i](k):
D˜[i]µ (k)−D[i]µ (k) = 0, D˜[i]x (k)−D[i]x (k) = O(ci(k))1ni .
(17)
Notice that ‖D(k)‖ is uniformly bounded. Substi-
tute (15) and (17) into (12), sum over [0, T ], and it
renders that there is some Υ′,Υ′′ > 0 such that the
following estimate holds:
2
T∑
k=0
α(k)〈Dˆ(k), η(k)− η〉
≤ ‖η(0)− η‖2 − ‖η(T + 1)− η‖2 + Υ′
T∑
k=0
α(k)2
+ Υ′′
T∑
k=0
α(k) max
i∈V
ci(k). (18)
Since {α(k)2} and {α(k) maxi∈V ci(k)} are summable,
then the right-hand side of (18) is finite when we let
T → +∞. We now show the following by contradiction:
lim inf
k→+∞
〈Dˆ(k), η(k)− η〉 ≤ 0. (19)
Assume that there are k0 ≥ 0 and  > 0 such that
〈Dˆ(k), η(k) − η〉 ≥  for all k ≥ k0. Since α(k) > 0 and
{α(k)} is not summable, then we have the following:
+∞∑
k=0
α(k)〈Dˆ(k), η(k)− η〉
≥
k0∑
k=0
α(k)〈Dˆ(k), η(k)− η〉
+
+∞∑
k=k0+1
α(k)〈Dˆ(k), η(k)− η〉
≥
k0∑
k=0
α(k)〈Dˆ(k), η(k)− η〉+ 
+∞∑
k=k0+1
α(k)
≥ +∞.
We then reach a contradiction, and thus (19) holds.
Equivalently, the following relation holds:
lim sup
k→+∞
〈Dˆ(k), η − η(k)〉 ≥ 0.
Since∇Θ is closed, the above relation implies that there
is a limit point η˜ ∈ K of the sequence {η(k)} such that
the following holds: 〈∇Θ(η˜), η− η˜〉 ≥ 0, ∀η ∈ K. Since
∇Θ is pseudo-monotone, then we have the following re-
lation:
〈∇Θ(η), η − η˜〉 ≥ 0, ∀η ∈ K. (20)
We now set out to show the following by contradiction:
〈∇Θ(η˜), η − η˜〉 ≥ 0, ∀η ∈ K. (21)
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Assume that there is ηˆ ∈ K such that the following holds:
〈∇Θ(η˜), ηˆ − η˜〉 < 0. (22)
Now choose ε ∈ (0, 1), and define ηε , ηˆ+ε(η˜− ηˆ). Since
K is convex, then we have ηε ∈ K. The following holds:
〈∇Θ(ηε), (1− ε)(ηˆ − η˜)〉 = 〈∇Θ(ηε), ηε − η˜〉 ≥ 0,
(23)
where in the inequality we use (20). It follows from (23)
that the following relation holds for any ε ∈ (0, 1):
〈∇Θ(ηε), ηˆ − η˜〉 ≥ 0, ∀η ∈ K. (24)
Since ∇Θ is closed, letting ε → 1 in (24) gives that:
〈∇Θ(η˜), ηˆ − η˜〉 ≥ 0, which contradicts (22). As a result,
the relation (21) holds. By [28], the relation (21) implies
that η˜ ∈ XUC. We replay η by η(k) in (21), and establish
the following:
〈∇Θ(η˜), η(k)− η˜〉 ≥ 0. (25)
Since ∇Θ is pseudo-monotone, it follows from (25) that
〈Dˆ(k), η(k)− η˜〉 ≥ 0. (26)
Replace η with η˜ in (10), apply (26), and it renders:
‖η(k + 1)− η˜‖2 − ‖η(k)− η˜‖2 ≤ α(k)2‖D(k)‖2. (27)
Sum up (27) over [s, k] and we have
‖η(k)− η˜‖2 ≤ ‖η(s)− η˜‖2 +
k−1∑
τ=s
α(τ)2‖D(τ)‖2. (28)
We take the limits on k first and then s on both sides
of (28). Since {α(k)} is square summable and {D(k)} is
uniformly bounded, we have
lim sup
k→∞
‖η(k)− η˜‖2 ≤ lim inf
s→∞ ‖η(s)− η˜‖
2.
It implies that {‖η(k)− η˜‖} converges. Since η˜ is a limit
point of {η(k)}, {η(k)} converges to η˜ ∈ XUC. Further-
more, we have x˜ ∈ XCVX by (P2) in Proposition 3.1. •
4.2 Scenario two: strongly monotone reduced game map
and known τmax
In the last section, the convergence of Algorithm 1 is en-
sured under the mild assumptions: τmax is unknown and
the game map ∇Θ is merely pseudo-monotone. This set
of assumptions requires the usage of diminishing step-
sizes. Note that diminishing step-sizes may cause a slow
convergence rate. The shortcoming can be partially ad-
dressed by choosing a constant step-size when the in-
equality constraints are absent and (A5) in Theorem 4.1
is strengthened to the following one:
Assumption 4.1 The map ∇Θr is strongly monotone
over X with constant ρ.
Algorithm 2 The distributed gradient-based algorithm
for Scenario two
Require: Each player in V chooses the initial state
x[i](0) ∈ Xi.
Ensure: At each k ≥ 0, each player i ∈ V executes the
following steps:
1. Each player i ∈ V updates its state according to the
following rule:
x[i](k + 1) = PXi [x[i](k)− αD[i](k)],
where the approximate gradient D[i](k) is given by:
[D[i](k)]` =
1
2ci(k)
{fi(x[i](k) + ci(k)e[`]ni ,Λi(k))
− fi(x[i](k)− ci(k)e[`]ni ,Λi(k))},
for ` = 1, · · · , ni.
2. Repeat for k = k + 1.
Algorithm 2 is proposed to address Scenario two. In par-
ticular, Algorithm 2 is similar to Algorithm 1, but has
two distinctions. Firstly, Algorithm 2 excludes the in-
equality constraints. Because the game map ∇Θ cannot
be strongly monotone due toHi being linear in µ[i]. Sec-
ondly, thanks to the strong monotonicity of ∇Θ, a con-
stant step-size replaces diminishing step-sizes. The fol-
lowing theorem summarizes the convergence properties
of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose the following holds:
(B1) the quantity 0 ≤ τmax < ρ4NLΘr is known;
(B2) Assumptions 2.1 and 3.1 hold;
(B3) the step-size α ∈ (0, ρ−4NLΘr τmax
L2
Θr
(2+16N2τmax)
);
(B4) The sequence {maxi∈V ci(k)} is summable.
(B5) Assumption 4.1 holds.
For any initial state x(0) ∈ X, the sequence of {x(k)}
generated by Algorithm 2 converges to x˜ ∈ XCVX.
Proof: First of all, for any k ≥ 0 and i, we de-
fine Dˆ[i](k) , ∇x[i]fi(x[i](k), {x[j](k)}j∈N IN
i
), which
is the gradient evaluated at the delay-free states. So,
the quantity Dˆ(k) is free of time delays and pertur-
bations. Similarly, for any k ≥ 0 and i, we define
D˜[i](k) , ∇x[i]fi(x[i](k),Λi(k)) which is the gradient
evaluated at the delayed states. Then the quantity D˜(k)
is free of perturbations but subject to time delays.
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We then write Algorithm 2 in the following compact
form:
x(k + 1) = PX [x(k)− αD(k)]. (29)
It is noticed that x˜ ∈ XCVX is a fixed point of the op-
erator PX [· − α∇Θr(·)] for any α > 0; i.e., it holds that
x˜ = PX [x˜ − α∇Θr(x˜)]. By this, we have the following
relations:
‖x(k + 1)− x˜‖2
= ‖PX [x(k)− αD(k)]− PX [x˜− α∇Θr(x˜)]‖2
≤ ‖(x(k)− x˜)− α(D(k)−∇Θr(x˜))‖2
= ‖x(k)− x˜‖2 − 2α〈x(k)− x˜, Dˆ(k)−∇Θr(x˜)〉
+ α2‖(D(k)− D˜(k)) + (D˜(k)− Dˆ(k)) + (Dˆ(k)− u)‖2
− 2α〈x(k)− x˜, D(k)− D˜(k)〉
− 2α〈x(k)− x˜, D˜(k)− Dˆ(k)〉
≤ (1− 2ρα+ 4L2Θrα2)‖x(k)− x˜‖2
+ 4α2(‖D(k)− D˜(k)‖2 + ‖D˜(k)− Dˆ(k)‖2)
+ 2α‖x(k)− x˜‖(‖D(k)− D˜(k)‖+ ‖D˜(k)− Dˆ(k)‖),
(30)
where we use the non-expansiveness property of the pro-
jection operator PX in the first inequality, and the strong
monotonicity and the Lipschitz continuity of∇Θr in the
last inequality. For the term of ‖Dˆ(k) − D˜(k)‖ in (30),
one can derive the following relations:
‖Dˆ(k)− D˜(k)‖ ≤ NLΘr
k−1∑
τ=k−τmax
‖x(τ + 1)− x(τ)‖
≤ NLΘr
k−1∑
τ=k−τmax
(‖x(τ + 1)− x˜‖+ ‖x(τ)− x˜‖)
≤ 2NLΘr
k−1∑
τ=k−τmax
‖x(τ)− x˜‖. (31)
Similar to (17), we have
D˜[i](k)−D[i](k) = O(ci(k))1ni . (32)
Substituting (31) and (32) into (30) yields:
‖x(k + 1)− x˜‖2
≤ (1− 2ρα+ 4L2Θrα2 + 4NLΘrατmax)‖x(k)− x˜‖2
+ (32N2L2Θrα
2 + 4NLΘrα)
k−1∑
τ=k−τmax
‖x(τ)− x˜‖2
+ 4α2(max
i∈V
ci(k))
2 + 2αmax
i∈V
ci(k)‖x(k)− x˜‖, (33)
where we use the relation 2ab ≤ a2 + b2.
To study the convergence of x(k) in (33), we define the
following notation:
ψ(k) , x(k)− x˜, ‖χ(k)‖ , max
k−τmax≤τ≤k−1
‖ψ(τ)‖,
e(k) , 4α2(max
i∈V
ci(k))
2 + 2αmax
i∈V
ci(k)‖x(k)− x˜‖.
Then (33) is rewritten as follows:
‖ψ(k + 1)‖ ≤ a‖ψ(k)‖+ b‖χ(k)‖+ e(k). (34)
where a , (1 − 2ρα + 4L2Θrα2 + 4NLΘrατmax), b ,
τmax(32N
2L2Θrα
2 + 4NLΘrα) and the sequence {e(k)}
is diminishing. From the recursion of (34), we can derive
the following relation for any pair of k > s ≥ 0:
‖ψ(k)‖ ≤ ak−s‖ψ(s)‖+
k−1∑
τ=s
ak−τ bχ(τ) +
k−1∑
τ=s
e(τ)
≤ ak−s‖ψ(s)‖+ b sup
s≤τ≤k
‖χ(τ)‖
k−1∑
τ=s
ak−τ +
k−1∑
τ=s
e(τ)
≤ ak−s‖ψ(s)‖+ b
1− a sups≤τ≤k ‖χ(τ)‖+
k−1∑
τ=s
e(τ). (35)
Recall that {maxi∈V ci(k)} and thus {(maxi∈V ci(k))2}
are summable. Take the limits on k and s at both sides
of (35), and it gives the following relation:
lim sup
k→+∞
‖ψ(k)‖ ≤ b
1− a lim supk→+∞ ‖χ(k)‖. (36)
On the other hand, one can see that
lim sup
k→+∞
‖χ(k)‖ = lim sup
k→+∞
‖ψ(k)‖. (37)
Since α ∈ (0, ρ−4NLΘr τmax
L2
Θr
(2+16N2τmax)
), then a1−b < 1. The com-
bination of (36) and (37) renders that
lim sup
k→+∞
‖ψ(k)‖ = 0. (38)
Apparently,
lim inf
k→+∞
‖ψ(k)‖ ≥ 0. (39)
The combination of (38) and (39) establishes the con-
vergence of {x(k)} to x˜. It completes the proof. •
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5 Discussions
5.1 Comparison of two scenarios
The two proposed algorithms are complementary. Al-
gorithm 1 can address inequality constraints, does not
need to know τmax and merely requires the game map to
be pseudo monotone. It comes with the price of poten-
tially slow convergence due to the utilization of dimin-
ishing step-sizes. In contrast, Algorithm 2 cannot deal
with inequality constraints, needs to know τmax and re-
quires the game map to be strongly monotone. It comes
with the benefit of potentially fast convergence due to
the utilization of a constant step-size.
5.2 Discussion on Assumption 3.1
The proposed algorithms rely upon Assumption 3.1. In
what follows, we will provide two sufficient conditions
for Assumption 3.1. Recall that σi,min, σi,max, σmin and
σmax are defined in Section 3.1.
5.2.1 Global Slater vectors
Assumption 5.1 There exist x¯ ∈ X and σ′ > 0 such
that ‖ −G[i](x¯)‖∞ ≥ σ′ for all i ∈ V .
The vector x¯ that satisfies Assumption 5.1 is referred to
as the global Slater vector. The existence of the global
Slater vector ensures the boundedness of XUC(M) as
follows.
Lemma 5.1 If Assumption 5.1 holds and G
[i]
` is con-
vex in x, then for any (x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC(Rm≥0), it holds that
‖µ˜[i]‖∞ ≤ σmax−σminσ′ for i ∈ V .
Proof: Pick any η˜ , (x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC(Rm≥0). It holds that
〈∇Θ(η˜), η˜ − η〉 ≤ 0. (40)
Choose η = (x¯T , 0T )T in (40), and we have
0 ≥ 〈∇Θr(x˜), x˜− x¯〉 −
∑
i∈V
〈µ˜[i], G[i](x˜)〉
+
∑
i∈V
mi∑
`=1
µ˜
[i]
` 〈∇x[i]G[i]` (x˜), x˜[i] − x¯[i]〉
≥ 〈∇Θr(x˜), x˜− x¯〉 −
∑
i∈V
〈µ˜[i], G[i](x¯)〉, (41)
where the last inequality uses µ˜
[i]
` ≥ 0 and Taylor theo-
rem and the convexity of G
[i]
` in x. It follows from (41)
and Assumption 5.1 that
‖µ˜[i]‖∞ ≤ −〈∇Θ
r(x˜), x˜− x¯〉
σ′
≤ σmax − σmin
σ′
.
•
5.2.2 Private Slater vectors
In Lemma 5.1, each player has to access the global in-
formation of x¯, σ′, σmin and σmax. In what follows, we
will derive a sufficient condition which only requires pri-
vate information of each player i to determine an upper
bound on µ[i].
Assumption 5.2 For each i ∈ V , there exists σi >
0 and x¯i ∈ Xi such that for any (x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC, ‖ −
G[i](x¯[i], x˜[−i])‖∞ ≥ σi holds.
The vector x¯[i] that satisfies Assumption 5.1 is referred
to as the private Slater vector. One case where Assump-
tion 5.2 holds is that G[i] only depends upon x[i] and, for
each i ∈ V , there is x¯[i] ∈ Xi such that ‖−G[i](x¯[i])‖∞ ≥
σi holds for some σi > 0.
Lemma 5.2 If Assumption 5.2 holds, then for any
(x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC(Rm≥0), it holds that ‖µ˜[i]‖∞ ≤ σi,max−σi,minσi
for i ∈ V .
Proof: Pick any (x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC(Rm≥0). By Assump-
tion 5.2, there is x¯[i] ∈ Xi such that
‖ −G[i](x¯[i], x˜[−i])‖∞ ≥ σ.
Since (x˜, µ˜) ∈ XUC, we then have the following:
Hi(x˜[i], x˜[−i], 0) ≤ Hi(x˜[i], x˜[−i], µ˜[i])
≤ Hi(x¯[i], x˜[−i], µ˜[i])
where in the first inequality we use 0 ∈ Mi and in the
second inequality we use x¯[i] ∈ Xi. The above relations
further render the following:
fi(x˜) ≤ fi(x¯[i], x˜[−i]) + 〈µ˜[i], G[i](x¯[i], x˜[−i])〉. (42)
Recall ‖−G[i](x¯[i], x˜[−i])‖∞ ≥ σi. Then the relation (42)
implies the relation of ‖µ˜[i]‖∞ ≤ σi,max−σi,minσi . •
5.3 Future directions
The current paper imposes several assumptions: (1) the
compactness of Xi; (2) the smoothness of component
functions; (3) identical α(k) or α for all the players; (4)
the convexity of component functions and constraints.
In particular, the compactness ofXi ensures the uniform
boundedness of partial gradients. The convexity guar-
antees that local optimum are also globally optimal in
the sense of Nash equilibrium. It is of interest to relax
these assumptions.
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6 Numerical simulations
In this section, we will provide a set of numerical sim-
ulations to verify the performance of our proposed al-
gorithms. The procedure sample(A) returns a uniform
sample from the set A.
6.1 Algorithm 1
Consider a power network which can be modeled as an
interconnected graph Gp , {Vp, Ep} where each node
i ∈ Vp represents a bus and each link in Ep represents
a branch. The buses in Vp are indexed by 1, · · · , N and
bus 1 denotes the feeder which has a fixed voltage and
flexible power injection. A lossless DC model is used to
characterize the relation between power generations and
loads at different buses and power flows across various
branches. Each bus is connected to either a power load
or supply and each load is associated with an end-user.
The set of load buses is denoted by Vl ⊆ Vp and the set
of supply buses is denoted by Vs ⊆ Vp.
The maximum available power supply at bus i ∈ Vs is
denoted by Si ≥ 0, and the intended power load at bus
i ∈ Vl is denoted by Li ≥ 0. If the total power supply ex-
ceeds the total intended power load, then all the intended
loads can be satisfied. Otherwise, some loads need to re-
duce. The reduced load of end-user i is denoted by Ri ∈
[0, Li]. The objective function of each end-user i is given
by fi(Ri) = ciRi+p(1
T
|Vl|(L−R))(Li−Ri)−ui(Li−Ri).
The quantity ciRi represents the disutility induced by
load reductionRi with ci > 0. The scalar p(1
T (L−R)) is
the charged price given the total actual load 1T (L−R).
The value ui(Li − Ri) stands for the benefit produced
by load Li −Ri.
Each end-user i aims to minimize its own objective func-
tion fi(Ri) by adjustingRi. Such decision making is sub-
ject to the physical constraints of the power grid. The
first constraint is that the total actual load cannot ex-
ceed the maximum available supply; i.e.,
1T|Vl|(L−R) ≤ 1T|Vs|S. (43)
Another set of constraints are induced by the limita-
tions of power flows on branches. LetHg ∈ [−1, 1]|E|×|Vg|
(resp. Hl ∈ [−1, 1]|E|×|Vl|) be the generation (resp. load)
shift factor matrix. For Hg, the (i, `) entry represents
the power that is distributed on line ` when 1MW is
injected into bus i and withdrawn at the reference bus.
Denote by fmaxe the maximum capacity of branch e. The
power flow constraint for branch e can be expressed as:
−fmax ≤ HgS −Hl(L−R) ≤ fmax, (44)
where fmax , col[fmaxe ]e∈Ep , S , col[Si]i∈Vs , L ,
col[Li]i∈Vl and R , col[Ri]i∈Vl .
The above description defines a non-cooperative game
among end-users in Vl as follows:
min
Ri∈[0,Li]
ciRi + p(1
T
|Vl|(L−R))(Li −Ri)− ui(Li −Ri)
s.t. 1T|Vl|(L−R) ≤ 1T|Vs|S
HgS −Hl(L−R)− fmax ≤ 0
−HgS +Hl(L−R)− fmax ≤ 0. (45)
In game (45), p is the pricing policy of load serving en-
tity (LSE). This is confidential information of LSE and
should not be disclosed to end-users. So the objective
function fi is partially unknown to end-user i. In addi-
tion, the numerical values of generation and load shift
factor matrices are of national security interest and are
kept confidential from the public. Therefore, the power
flow constraints are unknown to end-users. Assume that
all the end-users can communicate with LSE. Given R,
LSE broadcasts the price value p(1T|Vl|(L−R)), the power
imbalance 1T|Vl|(L − R) − 1T|Vs|S, and power limit vio-
lations HgS −Hl(L − R) − fmax and −HgS + Hl(L −
R)−fmax. In this way, end-users can access the values of
fi and G
[i] in Algorithm 1 without knowing their struc-
tures. 3
We choose ui(Li − Ri) = − 12ai(Li − Ri)2 + bi(Li −
Ri) with ai > 0. For the pricing mechanism, we use (4)
in [10]; i.e., p(w) = βw
1
η with β > 0, and η ∈ (0, 1). So
fi(R) = ciRi + (Li − Ri)β(1T|Vl|(L − R))
1
η + 12ai(Li −
Ri)
2 − bi(Li −Ri). One can compute the following:
∂2fi
∂2Ri
= ai − 2β 1
η
(1T|Vl|(L−R))
1
η−1
− β(Li −Ri) 1
η
(
1
η
− 1)(1T|Vl|(L−R))
1
η−2,
∂2fi
∂Ri∂Rj
= −β 1
η
(1T|Vl|(L−R))
1
η−1
− β(Li −Ri) 1
η
(
1
η
− 1)(1T|Vl|(L−R))
1
η−2.
Choose ai such that ai > (N − 2)β 1η (1T|Vl|L)
1
η−1 + (N −
1)βLi
1
η (
1
η − 1)(1T|Vl|L)
1
η−2 > 0. Then the monotonicity
property holds. Assume that there is a global Slater vec-
tor. Figure 1 shows the simulation results for the IEEE
30-bus Test System [1] and the system parameters are
3 Many networked engineering systems operate in a hierar-
chical structure; e.g., Internet, power grid and transportation
systems, where a central system operator is placed at the top
layer and end-users are placed at the bottom layer [11,34].
Here we assume that LSE can communicate with all the end-
users. This assumption is widely used in; e.g., network flow
control [22].
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adopted from MATPOWER [2]. The delays at each it-
eration are randomly chosen from 0 to 10.
6.2 Algorithm 2
Consider 10 players and their components functions are
defined as follows:
fi(x) =
1
2
((Q[i])Tx)2 + (q[i])Tx,
where
• Xi = [ψmi ψMi ] with ψmi = sample([−10 − 5]) and
ψMi = sample([5 10]);
• Q[i] ∈ R10 with Q[i]i = 1 and Q[i]j = 110 for j 6= i;
• q[i] ∈ R10 with q[i]j = sample([−50 50]) for j ∈ V .
One can verify that ρ = 110 and LΘr = 2 in Theorem 4.2.
By (B4), we have %b > 1. In the simulation, we choose
%b = 3. Figure 2 presents the estimate evolution of the
players.
Fig. 2. The estimates of Algorithm 2 for τmax = 10.
7 Conclusions
We have studied a set of distributed robust adaptive
computation algorithms for a class of generalized convex
games. We have shown their asymptotic convergence to
Nash equilibrium in the presence of network unreliabil-
ity and the uncertainties of component functions and il-
lustrated the algorithm performance via numerical sim-
ulations.
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